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BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is governed by the Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(h,j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Appellee adopts the issues presented for review designated by the 
Appellant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is one of correctness, granting no deference to either party, 
Glover vs. Boy Scouts of America. 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act 10 USCA 1408. See Appendix 
A for full text. 
Statute of Limitations, Utah Code Annotated 78-12-1, 78-12-22. See Appendix B 
for full text. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60, Clerical Errors. See Appendix C for full 
text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant (Mrs. Toone/Parkhurst) brought this action to modify a divorce decree 
entered December 16, 1983, seeking to adjudicate Appellant's entitlement to Appellee's 
(Mr. Toone's) military retirement. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
July 23, 1981. Divorce decree entered. The Court reserved issues of property 
division for future determination. 
July 9, 1982. Trial to allocate real and personal property. 
December 16, 1983. Trial Court enters "Corrected Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Decree. 
October 23, 1995. Defendant files a petition to divide Plaintiffs military 
retirement. 
September 25, 1996. Trial Court entered Summary Judgement, denying 
Defendant's Petition. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court granted Plaintiff/Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgement. 
Defendant/Appellant appealed. 
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Appellant's statement of facts assumes facts which are not supports .*: 
conclusions not found in the record. The uncontested facts are as follows: 
' 1. ' May, 1958. Plaintiff enters Nav\ Sen in-
2. June 20, 1958. The parties were married. 
• 3. ..' June22, l')81. I'lamlitl lilt" loi divorce. I-' " 
4. June 26, 1981. U.S. Supreme Court decides McCarty vs. McCart\ \ 453 
I T i . ~ I U I M i » I I '' ": '• ' 
5. • • June 30, 1981. Defendant- :• • . ^ .wer and ": 
Counterclaim asking that the Navy Retirement be divided R 4. See Appendix D, 
paragraph *> 
6. July 23, 1981. The parties were divorced. R-15. The Trial C 
issues uf property settlement for future resolution. 
', July 9, 1982. The Trial Court hears h»slim< «ii i Ilic A\ \ i on \ A real .mJ 
personal property. 
September... t9&~. ;. u, • -, i..» . , _ overturning the 
decision of McCarty vs. McCarty* retroactive to one day prior to McCarty on June 25, 
^1. 
November 4, 1982. Utah Supreme Court decide s the r;w . Woodward 
vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
io. December ; . is>8^  * Jiiir : ,K conclusions 
of Law together with a Judgement. 
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a. Findings of Fact (R-50)(R-70) states, "Each of the parties has a 
retirement," without detailing the sources. 
b. Judgement and Decree states, "Each of the parties has a 
retirement," (R-52). 
c. The Corrected Supplemental Judgement and Decree states, 
"Plaintiffs retirement is worth" $10,000. 
d. No exhibits in the file show the worth of Mr. Toone's retirement. 
11. The transcript of the trial held July 9, 1982 is unavailable. The Court file 
fails to allocate Plaintiffs $10,000 retirement into one or more retirement plans. 
12. The Judgement and Decree makes no mention of "Navy Retirement" nor 
"Utah State Retirement" nor "Civil Retirement". 
13. Lynn Toone entered the Service in May of 1958, and ultimately retired in 
1976, thus accruing benefits. Military retirement is payable when Plaintiff/Appellee 
reaches age 60 on May 3, 1998 (R-240). 
14. Defendant filed a petition seeking division of the benefits on October 23, 
1995. 
The Defendant's/Appellant's Brief contains several material false statements 
which should be brought to the attention of this Court. 
1. Brief page 6, line 14 states that "Mr. Toone's Utah State non-military 
retirement was worth approximately $10,000..." No such statement appears in the 
Decree. 
2. Brief page 6, line 17. " The Court offset these two (2) civil retirements..." 
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No such statement appears in the Decree. 
3. Brief page 6, line 20 states, "The Affidavits, subsequent exhibits and 
Findings and Decree show that the Court dealt only with the civil retirements..." 
Appellant assumes that the record refers only to civil retirement. Paragraph 10 of the 
signed Decree says only "net credit of retirement." 
4. Brief page 9, line 14. "Both parties admit for purposes of this appeal that 
the only retirements mentioned in the Decree of Divorce are Mr. Toone's retirement of 
$10,000 from UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY." No such admission appears in the record. 
What is admitted is that the Decree fails to mention "Navy retirement." It also fails to 
mention by name Utah State Retirement or any other "civil" retirement. 
5. Brief page 9, line 18. "The parties admit for purposes of this Appeal that 
only two (2) 'civil' retirements were discussed in the Court's Evidence and Findings." 
This statement is false and is not borne out in the Motions nor Affidavits of the parties. 
The Record on Appeal clearly shows that Appellant knew of the existence of the 
"Navy retirement" (Verified Answer and Counterclaim), and she is presumed to know of 
the existence of her rights under the Federal Statute. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred in concluding that the doctrine of Res 
Judicata barred the Appellant's claim. Appellee contends that Appellant had knowledge 
of the existence of the military retirement and should have been aware of the Federal 
Statute, made retroactive to a date PRIOR TO the dates of the trial and signing of the 
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Judgement and Decree. In addition, the Judgement and Decree only states a retirement of 
$10,000. Without a transcript of the Trial Court, it is impossible to tell whether or not the 
Trial Court considered the military retirement. 
POINT II 
Appellant claims that the "(sic) retirement" can now be divided 12 years after the 
entry of the Decree allocating the parties property interests. Appellee answers stating that 
the right to partition military retirement is a statutory right under Uniform Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act. There is an eight year Statute of Limitations. 
Appellant's claim is barred. 
POINT III 
Defendant claims laches cannot be a defense in this case because the Trial Court 
so held and no harm has occurred to Mr. Toone. Appellee disagrees with the Trial Court 
and Mrs. Parkhurst. There has been a 12 to 13 year delay in enforcing a statutory right by 
Mrs. Parkhurst. The parties and the Trial Court are without the benefit of the former Trial 
Court's record and the assets of the parties have been divided. Mrs. Parkhurst knew of 
the military retirement from the outset of the case, during the trials and lengthy delays. 
She knew or should have know of her rights under the Uniform Services Former Spouse 
Protection Act. Mr. Toone relied upon the military retirement to plan his own retirement. 
POINT IV 
Mrs. Parkhurst claims that the Trial Court erred in holding that there was no 
change in circumstances when the Congress passed the Uniform Services Former Spouse 
Protection Act. Congress passed the USFSPA in 1982, effective February 1, 1983, and 
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made it retroactive to June 25, 1981. Mrs. Parkhurst could have and should have and 
may have litigated her rights under the Act at the time of the divorce. Woodward vs. 
Woodward was decided during the pendency of this case. There was no change in 
circumstances between the parties by the passage of the Act, only a right of action created 
by Federal Statute. 
POINT V 
Mrs. Parkhurst claims that the Supreme Court decision in McCarty barred her 
from litigating her right to the "(sic) retirement". The facts of the case show that the 
McCarty decision was decided June 26, 1981. The parties were divorced on July 23, 
1981, but the Court reserved its ruling for the division of property until a year later on 
July 9, 1982. The Findings and Decree were ultimately signed on December 16, 1983, 
about 18 months later. Congress passed the USFSPA on September 8, 1982. The 
effective date of the Act was February 1, 1983. However, Subsection (c)(1) contained a 
retroactive date to June 25,1981. The time frame shows that Mrs. Parkhurst was not 
barred from asserting her rights. The lack of a record of the Trial and later proceedings 
leaves open to speculation the retirement actually considered by the Trial Court. The 
Trial Court in 1996 acknowledged the speculative nature of Mrs. Parkhurst's argument 
(R-226). 
POINT VI 
Mrs. Parkhurst claims that the Trial Court erred when it did not divide the 
retirement benefits as all other property was divided on an equal basis. Mr. Toone 
responds by noting that the original Trial Court did not define the source of the retirement 
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benefits, and therefore, there is no evidence that the military benefits were or were not 
included in the $10,000 lump sum figure used by the Court to calculate approximately the 
equal division of property. Mrs. Parkhurst's continual use of the phrase "civil retirement" 
does not alter the lack of specifics in the original Decree. 
DETAILED ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF "RES 
JUDICATA" BARRED APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO A DIVISION OF THE NAVY 
RETIREMENT WHERE THE NAVAL (sic) RETIREMENT WAS NOT EXPRESSLY 
ADJUDICATED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Appellant/Mrs. Parkhurst litigated the issues in her divorce from April of 
1981 until December of 1983. During this period of time, the U.S. Supreme Court, on 
June 26, 1981, held that military retirement pay was not divisible by State Courts. 
Congress reacted and passed the Former Spouse Protection Act, making it retroactive to 
June 25, 1981. The Supreme Court of this State decided Woodward vs. Woodward, infra. 
The knowledge of these decisions are imputed to the Appellant. Further compounding 
the situation is the lack of a transcript from the original Trial Court and Findings of Fact 
and a Judgement, which are silent as to the source of the $10,000 retirement owned by 
Mr. Toone. 
The Trial Court Memorandum Decision (R-226) recognizes that 13 years have 
lapsed since the Judgement of the initial Trial Court. 
In this case, certainly the value of the military retirement could have and may have 
been considered by the Court If the Court did not then address the issue with 
respect to military retirement, and should do so now, it would have to relitigate 
each of those other property and support issues which have been raised, litigated 
and ruled upon. In doing so, the rule of Res Judicata would be avoided. Page 2, 
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Memorandum Decision, September 10, 1996. 
The Supreme Court decision of McCartv vs. McCartv did not prevent the 
litigation of this issue. Mrs. Parkhurst knew of the military retirement and could have 
litigated the matter. She, in fact, may have litigated the issue. The transcript is not 
available. In Throckmorton vs. Throckmorton, 161 P.2d 121 (Utah App 1988), this Court 
determined that subsequent recognition of retirement benefits is not a substantial change 
in circumstances, thus precluding the application of Res Judicata. The Court recognized 
that principle, noting that the Trial Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes to property distribution, but that Courts are hesitant to disturb prior property 
distributions. 
However, the application of kes juaicaia is unique in divorce actions because of 
the equitable doctrine which allows Courts to reopen alimony, support or property 
distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a substantial change in 
circumstances, since the matter was previously considered by the Court, 
Thompson vs. Thompson. 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985). 
The Texas cases cited by the Appellant are not pertinent unless this Court overturns 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, infra. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
APPLYING THE EIGHT YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATION TO BAR 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR A DIVISION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT. 
A. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of this State has held that former 
spouses are tenant in common of retirement funds, which is contrary to the assertion in 
the Appellant's Brief. UCA 30-3-5 grants Courts jurisdiction to make orders in relation 
to property. Mr. Toone's military retirement is in his name alone. Woodward determines 
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that an asset accrued during marriage is subject to equitable distribution and not tenants in 
common ownership, (Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 at page 433). This 
retirement could have been or was distributed. 
The cases of Iverson vs. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974) and Booth vs Booth, 
722 P.2d 771 (Utah 1986) do not stand for the proposition suggested by Appellant, as 
they deal with joint tenant ownership of real property. Nor does Masseyvs Protazro, 
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983) apply, as it deals with tax titles. 
B. The Appellant claims the Statute of Limitations does not apply in this 
equitable action. The Appellant's right to divide military retirement is governed by 
statutory law. The USFSPA created the right, which is a legal remedy. Utah's Divorce 
Law requires an equitable distribution. Therefore, the Trial Courts are obligated to 
equitably distribute those assets divisible by statute. The Judgement in this case dated 
December 16, 1983, is a Decree. The Petition case dated October 23, 1995, in this case 
seeks to modify the Corrected Supplemental Divorce Decree. Eight years has expired 
since the rendition of the Judgement, UCA 78-12-1, 78-12-22. 
C. The Appellant claims that the Statute of Limitations is not applicable because 
Congress made the USFSPA retroactive to a day before the McCarty decision. The 
retroactive provision of the Act provided the Appellant an opportunity to fully and 
completely litigate her claim for military retirement. The effective date of the statute was 
June 26,1981, and the Decree was signed on December 16, 1983. The record shows no 
attempt to alter the general terms of the Decree to specify the type of retirement 
considered. 
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D. Appellant claims that a reservation by the Trial Court of jurisdiction tolls the 
Statute of Limitations. This argument is made without citation of statute or cases. 
Throckmorton, infra, provides an answer. The reservation of continuing jurisdiction 
found in the Statute (30-3-5 UCA) and as recited in the decree does not toll the Statute. 
A substantial change in circumstances, giving rise to a new claim for relief is not barred 
by Res Judicata. Where an issue was or could have been litigated and wasn't, under 
Throckmorton Res Judicata applies. If there is or could have been a judication, and a 
judgement is prepared, that commences the running of the Statute of Limitations. 
E. Defendant/Appellant claims that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to 
review property matters under UCA 30-3-5. 
Not so. If that were the case, there would never be an end to divorce litigation, 
(rarely is there an end now). Again, Mr. Toone reiterates that the "retirement" was not 
designated. This Court has no transcript. UCA 30-3-5 does not allow a subsequent Court 
to arbitrarily relitigate the issue without a substantial change in circumstances, Iverson vs. 
Iverson. 526 P.2d 1126. 
Notwithstanding the equitable powers of the District Court in inter-family 
controversies in divorce matters and the acknowledged broad latitude of discretion 
allowed therein, the Court cannot act arbitrarily, or on supposition or conjecture as 
to facts upon which to justify its order. 
In the absence of any proceeding in which evidence was taken relating to the 
equities of the parties; and in the absence of a transcript of any evidence of that 
character, we do not see in this record any justification for the granting of a 
Motion for Summary Judgement... 
Rule 60 allows amendment of "clerical errors" not substantive matters. 
POINT III 
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APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT LACHES CANNOT BE A DEFENSE IN THE CASE 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT SO HELD AND NOT HARM HAS OCCURRED TO 
MR. TOONE. 
It should be noted that this Court is not bound by an erroneous ruling of law of the 
Trial Court. See Standard of Review, Page 4, Appellant's Brief. 
Laches may, in fact, be the appropriate legal and equitable doctrine in this case. 
Laches required that there be an unreasonable delay in bringing the action. In this case, 
there is at least a 13 year delay. That delay has not only faded the memories of the parties 
but occasioned usage of attorneys not privy to the initial proceedings. No transcript is 
available to determine what, in fact, the Court considered as "retirement". The 
nonspecific Decree, drawn by Appellant's attorney complicates determination of 
"retirement". Therefore, the Appellant's delay has been unreasonable and has deprived 
both parties of needed recollection and evidence. 
The second prong in the test for laches is that the Plaintiff/Appellee has been 
prejudiced by the delay. The Trial Court recognized the problem when it stated in the 
Memorandum Decision that if the Court litigated the issue of retirement, it may have to 
modify all other property matters that were considered by the Court. It can be reasonably 
assumed that Mr. Toone relied on the Judgement and Decree for the past 13 years in 
planning his future. His Utah State Retirement was cashed in to pay Mrs. Parkhurst her 
equity in the home. To now divide military retirement would be a substantial burden on 
him. Nothing in the record reveals a need on Appellant's part for the retirement money. 
Appellant cites the case of Openshaw vs Openshaw* 144 P.2d 528 (Utah 1943) for 
the proposition that laches cannot be imputed to one who is ignorant of the facts and for 
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that reason, failed to assert her rights. An additional citation from that case might be 
beneficial. 
Page 531. But mere inaction or delay, short of the period of limitations, in 
enforcement of payment of an obligation already accrued, without more, is 
insufficient upon which to predicate laches. 
Sheppard's Utah Citations reflects many cases decided after Openshaw, but none 
overruling the case law established. Therefore, Appellant having taken no action withing 
the period of limitations under the Openshaw decision, the doctrine of laches should 
apply. 
Appellant contends that laches does not apply to retirement benefits received 
prospectively because there is not prejudice to the serviceman. Thereafter, the Appellant 
cites two Arizona cases, Beltran vs. Razo* 788 P.2d 1256 (Ariz App. 1990) and Flynn vs. 
Rogers, 834 P.2d 148 (Ariz 1992). At the expense of sounding over simplistic, these 
cases are not relevant. First, they are from a neighbor state that is a community property 
state. Arizona has a statute which creates a tenancy in common in retirement assets, 
A.R.S. Section 25-318 (B). Utah has no similar statute. Second, the case was brought 
within the period of limitations. The serviceman/husband claimed laches. The argument 
was rejected by the Arizona Court. Under Arizona law, the military benefits were, after 
USFSPA held by the parties as tenants in common, and therefore, the division by the 
Court was merely procedural. 
Utah does not have a statute similar to the Arizona statute making the parties 
tenants in common. Utah Courts have not held that the parties are tenants in common. 
Such a ruling is inconsistent with present common law principles in Utah. Appellant 
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mixes common law principles and community property law principles. Such a mix is 
necessary for the Appellant to rationalize the result suggested. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING NO CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED JUSTIFYING REOPENING THE DECREE. 
Appellant claims that the enactment of the USFSPA created a change in 
circumstances. Throckmorton, infra, sets forth the distinction between and change in 
circumstances as it relates to factual circumstances. This is distinguished from a change 
in legal precedent or statute which Throckmorton, infra, held not to be a substantial 
change in circumstances. 
Legal recognition of a new category of property rights after a divorce decree has 
been entered is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change in 
circumstances (at page 124). 
McCarty may have changed Utah Law for a brief period of time, but the 
enactment of the USFSPA nullified the decision. The Decree allocating property rights in 
this case was signed after enactment of the USFSPA without objection by Appellant. 
Appellant continues to miscite the date of the entry of the property settlement. Entry of a 
divorce without more is not a final decree and that date has no relevance. Copier vs. 
Copier, 318 Ut. Adv. Rep. 9 states that the date of the final decree is the date concluding 
the divorce. Therefore, the pertinent date in this case is December 16, 1983. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT MILITARY RETIREMENT EARNED DURING THE 
MARRIAGE IS CONSIDERED MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER UTAH LAW AND 
CAPABLE OF DIVISION WERE IT NOT FOR THE McCarthy DECISION. 
The reply to this issue is found in the facts. McCarthy was decided on June 26, 
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1981. The parties were divorced in July of 1981. The Trial Court decided only the issue 
of the divorce and left until a future date the issues of property settlement. The case 
lingered on, and one year later in July of 1982, a hearing was held dividing the real and 
personal property. In November, the Supreme Court decided Woodward, infra. In 
September of that year, Congress passed the USFSPA with an effective date of February 
|l, 1993. The ruling in McCarthy was effectively voided by the retroactive provision. 
IThis case still languished in the Utah Court System until December of 1983 when 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were presented to the District Judge. 
Wo party before or after entry of the Decree filed a Motion to Amend the Findings 
specifying which retirements the Trial Court referenced, nor did either party cite 
Woodward or the USFSPA as dictating a clarification of the Findings and Decree. 
Appellee has no quarrel with the proposition that military retirement is a marital 
asset and that the retirement is capable of division. The plain and simple fact is that 
Appellant knew of the military retirement and had an opportunity to litigate retirement 
and did so in such nonspecific terms that the Trial Court now is unable to make a decision 
without readjudicating the entire case in the absence of a transcript. Appellant's attorney 
drew the Findings and Decree, and the same law firm now seeks a second hearing 13 
years later to litigate military retirement separately from the prior division of assets. 
Appellant is barred not only by laches, but by the Statute of Limitations. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT. 
In this discussion, Appellant continues to assume that the "retirement" mentioned 
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in the Findings and Decree are "civil" retirements only. The Trial Court did not make 
that assumption in the Memorandum Decision. Nor can anyone without a transcript. 
Appellant's use of the phrase "civil retirement" does not create a fact, but it does tend to 
enforce her position if his Court were to believe that fact. 
Appellant cites the cases of Bailevvs. Bailey\ 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987) and 
Mar chant vs. Mar chant, 143 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). It is not clear how those cases 
relate to this case, as in each instance the Trial Court at the time of the entry of the Decree 
divided the retirement, (although incorrectly). The appeals dealt with the date and 
manner of distribution, not the date of the adjudication. 
The Bailey case, infra, relates to the allocation of liquid assets (house) with a 
present value offset by future valued assets (retirement). This case has no bearing on the 
issue presented by Appellant. 
Likewise, the Marchant case, infra, deals with the failure of the Trial Court to 
properly address the division of retirement, as set forth in Woodward vs. Woodward, 
infra. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not a case of first impression. The decision in this case is controlled by 
Federal Statute and pre-existing case law decided by the two Appellate courts of this 
State. 
The important facts are the dates of the events, showing that the Appellant could 
have, should have, and may have litigated the issue of military retirement. Time bars 
Appellant's claim. 
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This decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed 
DATED this'Aiay of July, 1997. 
George W. Preston 
Attorney for Appellee 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to Mr. Marlin J. Grant. Attorney for Appellant, 88 West 




10 6 1407 GENERAL MILITARY LAW SUM. A 
(f) In the case of a member who is retired under any section of title 14, 
the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of 
monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36 months (whether 
or not consecutive) of active duty as a member of a uniformed service. 
(g) In the case of a member whose retired pay is computed under section 
16 of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers* Act of 1948 
(33 U.S.C. 853<?), the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the 
total amount of monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36 
months (whether or not consecutive) of active duty as a member of a uni-
formed service. 
(h) In the case of a member who is retired under section 210(g) or 211(a) 
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 212(a)), the monthly 
retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of monthly basic pay 
which the membej received for any 36 months (whether or not consecutive) 
of active duty as a member of a uniformed service. 
(Added Pub.L*. 96 -342 , Title VIII, § 813(a)(1), Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100, and 
amended Pub.L. 96 -513 , Title I, § 113(c), Title V, §§ 501(21). 511(53), Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2877, 2908, 2925.) 
M- Historical Note 
References In Text. Section 16 of the Subsec. (d)(1). Pub.L. 96-513, § 501(21), 
Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned substituted "or 6383" for "6381, 6383, 6390, 
Officers' Act of 1948 (33 U.SC. 853o). re- 6394, 6396, 6398, or 6400". 
ferred to in subsec. (g), is section 16 of Act Effective Date of 1980 Amendment. 
June 3, 1948. c 390, 62 Stat. 299, which is Amendment by sections 113(c) and 501(21) 
classified to section 853o of Title 33, Naviga-
 o f P u b L 9 6 _ 5 | 3 effective Sept 15, 1981, but 
tion and Navigable Waters.
 t h e authority to prescribe regulations under 
Section 210(g) and 211(a) of the Public the amendment by section 113(c) of Pub.L 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 96-513 effective on Dec. 12, 1980, see section 
212(a)), referred to in subsec. (h), are sections 701 of Pub.L. 96-513, set out as an Effective 
210(g) and 211(a) of Act July I, 1944, c 373, Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 
Title II, 58 Stat. 687, 688, which are classified 101 of this title. 
to sections 211(g) and 212(a) of Title 42, The Amendment by section 511(53) of Pub L 
Public Health and Welfare, respectively 96-513 effective Dec. 12. 1980, see section 
1980 Amendment. Subsec. (a)(1). Pub L. 701(b)(3) of Pub L. 96-513. set out as an Ef-
96-513, § 511(53), substituted "after Septem- fective Date of 1980 Amendment note under 
ber 7, 1980" for "on or after the date of the section 101 of this title, 
enactment of the Department of Defense Au- Legislative History. For legislative history 
thonzation Act. 1981".
 ftnd purpose 0[ p„b L. 96-342. see 1980 US 
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub L. 96-513. § 113(c), Code Cong and Adm News, p. 2612. See, 
added references to sections 633, 634, 635, also, Pub L 96-513, 1980 U.S. Code Cong. 
636. and 1251. and Adm.News, p. 6333. 
Cross References 
Computation of retired pay of personnel of— 
Air Force, see section 8991 of this title. 
Army, see section 3991 of this title. 
Coast Guard, see section 423 of Title 14, Coast Guard 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, see section 853o of Title 33, Naviga-
tion and Navigable Waters. 
Computation of retired pay of personnel of Public Health Service— 
Commissioned officers, see section 212 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. 
Officers of Regular Corps in full grade twice failing selection for promotion, see section 
211 of Title 42. 
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Higher retired pay for members of Navy or Marine Corps who serve satisfactorily under tem-
porary appointments, see section 6151 of this title 
Recomputatton of retired pay to reflect advancement on retired list— 
Air Force, see section 8992 of this title. 
Army, see section 3992 of this title. 
Retainee pay of member transferred to Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve when not 
on active duty, see section 6330 of this title. 
Retired grade and pay of— 
Enlisted members of Regular Navy or Marine Corps with thirty or more years of service, 
see section 6326 of this title. 
Officers with forty and thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps or retired 
while serving as admiral, vice admiral, general, or lieutenant general by virtue of 
temporary appointment, see section 6325 of this title. 
Officers with thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6322 of 
this title. 
Officers with twenty years of service in Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6323 of this 
title. 
Retired pay of regular officers of Navy or Marine Corps designated for limited duty— 
In grades of lieutenant commander in Navy and of major in Marine Corps for failure of 
selection for promotion, see section 6383 of this title. 
Upon completion of thirty years of service, see section 6383 of this title. 
Library References 
Armed Services <g=>23 4. C.J.S Armed Services §§ 80, 114 to 120. 
§ 1 4 0 8 . Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with 
court orders 
(a) In this section: 
(1) "Court** means— 
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of 
title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and 
(O any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country 
with which the United States has an agreement requiring the Unit-
ed States to honor any court order of such country. 
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annul-
ment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, 
or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a 
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of di-
vorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, 
ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously 
issued decree), which— 
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of 
that court; 
(B) provides for— 
(1) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b))); 
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(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 662(c))); or 
(HD division of property (including a division of community property); and 
( O specifically provides for the payment of an amount, ex-
pressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired or retain-
er pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member to 
the spouse or former spouse of that member. 
(3) "Final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be tak-
en or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for 
taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a 
decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has 
been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly re-
tired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled (other than the 
retired pay of a member retired for disability under chapter 61 of this 
title) less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the United States; 
(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired 
or retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures or-
dered by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts 
waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; 
(O arc properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax 
purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or re-
quired by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not 
greater than would be authorized if such member claimed all de-
pendents to which he was entitled; 
(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402(i)) if such member presents evidence 
of a tax obligation which supports such withholding; 
(E) are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not 
including amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or 
(F) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this 
title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom 
payment of a portion of such member's retired or retainer pay is 
being made pursuant to a court order under this section. 
(5) "Member** includes a former member. 
(6) "Spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former 
husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date 
of a court order, was married to that member. 
(b) For the purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated 
for receipt of service of court orders under regulations prescribed 
pursuant to subsection (h) or, if no agent has been so designated, 
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the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by certi-
fied or registered mail, return receipt requested; 
(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
(O the court order or other documents served with the court 
order identify the member concerned and include the social securi-
ty number of such member; and 
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court 
order certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.App. 501 et seq.) were 
observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(O includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice 
that it is issued without authority of law. 
(c)(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposa-
ble retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning 
after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as property 
of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction 
of such court. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not cre-
ate any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or 
otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or former 
spouse. 
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply 
for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any pay-
ment under this section. 
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of a mem-
ber in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdic-
tion over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of 
military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domi-
cile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the juris-
diction of the court. 
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order 
with respect to the payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay of a 
member to the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary 
shall, subject to the limitations of this section, make payments to the spouse 
or former spouse in the amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of 
the member specifically provided for in the court order. In the case of a 
member entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective 
service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days 
after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the 
court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date 
on which the member first becomes entitled to receive retired or retainer 
pay. 
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(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made 
under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years 
or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service 
creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay, 
payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include 
an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of 
disposable retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member 
or property of the member and his spouse. 
(3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than 
once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary 
normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired or retainer pay in order to 
comply with a court order. 
(4) Payments from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member 
pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the 
applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of the mem-
ber or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to whom pay-
ments are being-made, whichever occurs first. 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of 
property (including a division of community property) in addition to an 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall, 
subject to the limitations of this section, pay to the spouse or former spouse 
of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member, 
any part of the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under the 
division of property upon effective service of a final court order of garnish-
ment of such amount from such retired or retainer pay. 
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed SO percent of such 
disposable retired or retainer pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which 
provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more 
than one former spouse from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member, such pay shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of para-
graph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis. Such court 
orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of 
that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains after the 
satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served. 
OKA) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under 
this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a 
month to the same spouse or former spouse from the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse the least amount of disposable retired or re-
tainer pay directed to be paid during that month by any such conflict-
ing court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired or 
retainer pay which remains available for payment of such court orders 
based on when such court orders were effectively served and the limita-
tions of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); 
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(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired=or retainer pay that is 
equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest amount of retired or re-
tainer pay required by any conflicting court order to be paid to the 
spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or 
former spouse under clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which re-
mains available for payment of any conflicting court order based 
on when such court order was effectively served and the limita-
tions of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
(iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of 
that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less any amount paid 
during such month pursuant to legal process served under section 459 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid during 
such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this sec-
tion, other than such conflicting court orders) minus— 
(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid under 
clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay retained 
under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause 
(ii) of subparagraph (a) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a 
court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or for-
mer spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being 
provided with such an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in 
accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section 
and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Securi-
ty Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of which provide for payments during a month 
from the retired or retainer pay of the same member, such court orders and 
legal process shall be satisfied on a first-come, first-serve basis. Such court 
orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to 
such orders and legal process and which remain available in accordance 
with the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this para-
graph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal 
process which have been previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the 
disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the Secretary con-
cerned under all court orders pursuant to this section and all legal processes 
pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with 
respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the disposable retired or 
retainer pay payable to such member. 
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court or-
ders provides for the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer 
pay which exceeds the amount of such pay available for payment because of 
the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served 
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Historical Note 
References In Text. Section 462 of the So <n T . I .«, 
c.al Security Act, referred to ,„ subsec (a)(2 l\l'£h !*:""** J a n 4 ' , 9 7 5 - * •* L 
B)(i), („). and section 459 of that V t re- I t L § l° , (a\ 8 8 S t a t 2357, and 
Terred to in subsec (eX3XA)(ui), (4)(A) 'fB> IZI ASO' * * c , a s s , f i e d t o sections 662 
(5) and (6). are sections ?62 of Act Aug f i ' S S | S a n d T T ^ ' ° f ^ ^ ™ C P u b " c 
P ' P u ' ' T",e ,V' « added ^a? {J HCa,th 8nd Wdfare 
J977, PubL 95-30, Title V, 6 50Ifd> 9t c . 
Stat 159. and 459 of Act Aug 14 1933
 c r^ TJt°2(l) °f t h e , n t e r n a l Avenue 
8 . 1V35, c Code of 1954, referred to in subsec (aX4XD) 
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K classified to section 3402(i) of Title 26, In-
ternal Revenue Code 
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 
of l<>40, referred to in subsec (bXIXD), is 
Act Oct 17, 1940, c 888, 54 Stat 1178, 
which is classified generally to section 501 et 
seq of the Appendix to Title 50, War and 
National Defense For complete classifica-
tion of this Act to the Code, see section 501 
of the Appendix to Title 50, and Tables vol-
ume 
Effective Date: Transition Provisions. 
Section 1006 of Pub L 97-252 provided that 
"(a) The amendments made by this title 
[enacting this section and sections 1072(2)(F), 
I086(CX3), and 1447(6H10) and amending 
sections 1448(aX3XA), (B), (b), and 1450(a) 
(4), (0 of this title and enacting provisions set 
out as notes under section 1401 of this title 
and this section] shall take effect on the first 
day of the first month [Feb 1, 1983J which 
begins more than one hundred and twenty 
days after the date of the enactment of this 
title [Sept 8, I982J 
"(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title 
10, United States Code [subsec (d) of this 
section], as added by section 1002(a), shall 
apply on!) with respect to payments of retired 
or retainer pay for periods beginning on or af-
ter the effective date of this title [Feb 1, 
1983, provided in subsec (a)], but without 
regard to the date of any court order How-
ever, in the case of a court order that became 
final before June 26, 1981, payments under 
such subsection may only be made in accor-
dance with such order as in effect on such 
date and without regard to any subsequent 
modifications 
"(c) The amendments made by section 
1003 of this title (enacting section 1447(6) to 
(10) and amending sections 1448(a)(3)(A), 
(B), (b) and 1450(a)(4), (0 of this title] shall 
apply to persons who become eligible to par-
ticipate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided 
for in subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, 
United States Code, [section 1447 et seq of 
this title], before, on, or after the effective 
date of such amendments [Feb \, 1983, pro-
vided in subsec (a) ] 
10 § 1408 
Note 1 
"(d) The amendments made by section 
1004 of this title [enacting sections 1072(2)(F) 
and i086(cX3) and amending section 1076(b) 
of Jhis title] and the provisions of section 
1005 of this title (set out as a note under sec-
tion 1408 of this title] shall apply in the case 
of any former spouse of a member or former 
member of the uniformed services only if the 
final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annul-
ment of the marriage of the former spouse 
and such member or former member is dated 
on or after the effective date [Feb 1, 1983, 
provided in subsec (a) ] of such amendments 
"(e) For the purposes of this section— 
"(1) the term 'court order' has the same 
meaning as provided in section 1408(aX2) 
of title 10, United States Code [subsec (a) 
(2) of this section] (as added by section 
1002 of this title), 
"(2) the term 'former spouse' has the 
same meaning as provided in section 
1408(a)(6) of such title [subsec (aX6) of 
this section] (as added by section 1002 of 
this title), and 
"(3) the term 'uniformed services' has 
the same meaning as provided in section 
1408(a)(7) of such title [subsec (a)(7) of 
this section] (as added by section 1002 of 
this title)' 
Short Title. For Short Title of Pub L 
97-252, T/tle X, Sept 8, 1982, 96 Stat 730, 
constituting "FORMER SPOUSES' PRO-
TECTION" provisions, see Short Title of 
1982 Amendments note set out under section 
1401 of this title 
Commissary and Exchange Privileges. 
Section 1005 of Pub L 97-252 provided that 
"The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to pro-
vide that an unremarried former spouse de-
scribed in subparagraph (F)(i) of section 
1072(2) of title 10, United States Code [sec-
tion 1072(2)(F)(i) of this title] (as added by 
section 1004), is entitled to commissary and 
post exchange privileges to the same extent 
and on the same basis as the surviving spouse 
of a retired member of the uniformed ser-
vices " 
Notes of Decisions 
Offsets against retired pay 2 
Retroactive effect of court decisions 
I Retroactive effect of court decisions 
Even if this section should be given pro-
spective application only where event which 
triggered trial court's granting of relief, grant-
ing of certiorari in case in which Supreme 
Court had held that military retirement pen-
sions were not subject to division as commu-
nity property, was not itself change in law, at 
time motion to set aside interlocutory judg-
ment was before trial court there was no 
change of law sufficient to permit husband to 
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evade efTects of his own stipulation dividing 
husband's military pension, thus, trial court 
abused its discretion in setting aside that por-
tion of interlocutory decree dividing hus-
band's military pension In re Marriage of 
Frederick, Cal App 1981. 190 Cal Rptr 588 
Use by Congress of date that Supreme 
Court decided that military retirement pen-
sions were not subject to division as commu-
nity property upon dissolution of marriage as 
reference in this section evidenced legislative 
intent that law relative to community proper* 
ty treatment of military retirement pensions 
be as though Supreme Court holding did not 
exist, that is, that such pensions would be 
subject to division as community property be-
fore and after Supreme Court decision Id 
Although Superior Court awarded wife a 
one-half community interest in portion of 
husband's military, retirement pension which 
accrued during years of marriage, and al-
though, three months after final judgment of 
dissolution -was entered, United States Su-
preme Court decided McCarty v McCarty, 
Cal 1981, 101 SCt 2728, 453 US 210, 69 
L Ed 2d 589. holding that federal law prohib-
its division of military retirement pensions 
and preempts state community property law, 
the award of a community interest in hus-
band's pension to his wife would not be re 
versed under a retroactive application of Mc 
Carty, since Congress, subsequent to 
McCarty, enacted this section whose purpose 
was to overrule McCarty, and since the law 
as it now stands thus supports the Superior 
Court's award In re Marriage of Buikema, 
1983, 188 Cal Rptr 856, 139 Cal App 3d 689 
Arizona community property law could be 
applied in determining divisibility of interest 
in military retirement benefits earned during 
marriage, at least in cases still pending in trial 
court or on appeal at time of enactment of 
this section removing federal preemption of 
state community property laws, with regard 
to military retirement benefits, found by Unit-
ed States Supreme Court to exist under prior 
law Steczo v Steczo, 1983, 659 P 2d 1344, 
135 Anz 199 
2. Offsets against retired pay 
In divorce proceeding, trial court did not 
err in awarding wife entire unpaid balance 
due on parties' home, which had been sold, 
although husband contended balance on 
house was awarded to wife as offset against 
husband's military retirement pay Matter of 
Marriage of Smedley, 1982, 653 P 2d 267, 60 
Or App 249 
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CHAPTER 73—ANNUITIES BASED ON 
RETIRED OR RETAINER P A r 
Subchapter Sec. 
I. Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan 1431 
II. Survivor Benefit Plan 1447 
Historical Note 
Codification. Pub L 92-425 amended the 2925, in chapter heading struck out ", Sum-
chapter heading without reference to the ear- vor Benefit Plan" following "Pay" 
her amendment by Pub L 87-381, § 1(1), 
Oct 4, 1961, 75 Stat 810, which substituted 1972 Amendment. Pub L 92-425, § 1(1), 
"Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Sept 21, 1972, 86 Stat 706, added subchapter 
Plan" for "Annuities Based on Retired or Re- analysts 
tamer Pay" Amendment by Pub L 92-425, 
§ 1(1), Sept 21, 1972. 86 Stat 706, has been
 1 9 6 1 Amendment. Pub L 87-381, § 1(1). 
executed to chapter heading as originally en- Q^
 4> 1961f 75 Stat 810. substituted "Re-Kit& tired Serviceman s Family Protection Plan" 
1980 Amendments. Pub L 96-513, Title for "Annuities Based on Retired or Retainer 
V, $ 5!1(54)(A), Dec 12, 1980. 94 Stat Pay" in chapter heading 
Cross References 
Commissioned officers of Public Health Service, applicability of this chapter to, see section 
213a of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare 
Exclusion from gross income, see sections 72, 101, 122 and 2039 of Title 26, Internal Revenue 
Code 
Exemption for levy for collection of taxes, see section 6334 of Title 26 
Gift tax transfers, payments to beneficiary after death, see section 2517 of Title 26 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, applicability of this chapter to, see section 
857a of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters 
Repayment of retired pay by beneficiary, see section 8317 of Title 5, Government Organization 
and Employees 
Retired or retainer pay defined to exclude annuity payable to eligible beneficiary under this 
chapter for purposes of dual pay and dual employment provisions, see section 5531 of 
Title 5 
Retired pay defined, see section 8311 of Title 5 
SUBCHAPTER I—RETIRED SERVICEMAN'S 
FAMILY PROTECTION PLAN 
Sec. 
1431 Election of annui ty members of armed forces 
1432 Election of annuity: former members of armed forces. 
1433 Mental incompetency of member 
1434 Kinds of annuities that may be elected 
1435. Eligible beneficiaries 
1436. Computation of reduction in retired pay; withdrawal for severe fi-
nancial hardship 
1437. Payment of annuity 
1438 Deposits for amounts not deducted 
1439. Refund of amounts deducted from retired pay. 
1440. Annuities not subject to legal process. 
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Effect of payment, acknowledg-
ment, or promise to pay. 
Action barred in another state 
barred here. 





Separate trial of statute of limi-
tations issue in malpractice 
actions. 
Statute of limitations — Asbes-
tos damages. 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-1; 1987, ch. 19, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Affirmative defense, 
statute of limitations as, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P. 
Antitrust Act actions, § 76-10-925. 
Cities and towns, claims and actions against, 
§§ 11-14-21, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-29, 
78-12-30. 
Collection agency bond, actions on, § 12-1-3. 
Common carriers, claims and actions for loss 
or damage to freight, § 54-3-16. 
Contracts for sale of goods, § 70A-2-725. 
Counties, claims and actions against, 
§§ 17-15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 
78-12-30. 
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et 
seq. 
Improvement district proceedings, § 17A-3-
330. 
Insurance contracts, actions on, 
§ 31A-21-313. 
Marketable record titles, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Municipal bond proceedings, § 11-14-21. 
Pleading statute of limitations, Rule 9(h), 
U.R.C.P. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
Protest of solicitation or award of public con-
tract, § 63-56-55. 
Public works programs, contesting ordi-
nances and bonds, § 55-3-16. 
Securities Act, §§ 61-1-4, 61-1-22. 
State, actions against, §§ 63-30-12, 
63-30-15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 




—Applicable foreign law. 
Nature and extent of right. 
—Legal. 




—Failure to plead. 
When statute begins to run. 
—Commencement of another action. 
—Existence of cause of action. 
—Particular proceedings. 
—Relation back. 
Amendment to complaint. 
—Remediability of claim. 
—Service of summons. 
Applicability of section. 
—Administrative discipline. 
In the absence of specific legislative author-
ity, civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable 
to administrative disciplinary proceedings. 
Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Discovery. 
The discovery rule has no application when 
an action easily could have been filed between 
the date of discovery and the end of the limita-
tion period. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen 
Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987). 
Escheat proceedings. 
—Applicable foreign law. 
Five-year limitation period within which 
heirs must claim estate to prevent its escheat 
after death of intestate without apparent heirs 
is subject to provisions of treaty between 
United States and country of alien intestate, 
requiring actual notice to consular authorities 
of intestate's death without apparent heirs. In 
re Apostolopoulos' Estate, 68 Utah 344, 250 P. 
469, 253 P. 1117, 48 A.L.R. 1322 (1926). 
Nature and extent of right 
—Legal. 
The statute of limitations governs legal title, 
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lapse of time, heirs are also barred, had no ap-
plication where property had been distributed 
in accordance with statute, and heir seeking to 
recover such property distributed to him while 
he was minor within two years after he 
attained majority was not barred from main-
taining action, since limitation did not start to 
run against plaintiff until he had attained ma-
jority under this section Robbins v Duggms, 
61 Utah 542, 216 P 232 (1923) (decided under 
prior law) 
Purchaser at tax sale. 
—Right to title. 
Where defendant purchased tax deed from 
county, and immediately thereafter entered 
into possession of property, paid taxes on prop-
erty for statutory time, made valuable im-
provements on property, and held property 
openly and notoriously, he was entitled to have 
title to property in controversy against all par-
ties except those under disability Baker v 
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P 117 (1920) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 178 et seq 
C.J.S. — 54 CJ.S Limitation of Actions 
§ 105 et seq 
Key Numbers. 
70 et seq 
Limitation of Actions 
ARTICLE 2 
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of 
any state or territory within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide 
support or maintenance for dependent children. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26. 
Cross-References. — Execution to issue 
within eight years, Rule 69(a), U R C P 
Judgment a hen for eight years, § 78-22-1 
Uniform Act on Paternity, § 78-45a-l et seq 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
§ 78-45-1 et seq 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act § 77-31-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Judgments or decrees 
Paternity proceedings 
Pleadings 
Renewal of judgment 
Stipulations 
Support or maintenance 
Tolling 
Cited 
Judgments or decrees. 
Statute of limitations begins to run from 
time of the rendition and entry of judgment or 
decree Sweetser v Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P 
599, 47 L R A (n s ) 145, 1916C Ann Cas 620 
(1913) 
Where judgment payable in installments 
provided that plaintiff could have execution for 
total amount due if default in payments should 
be made, plain intent was that execution 
should issue for only such amounts as were due 
at time of default so that statute did not begin 
to r w fom date tf default BvielW Dvrci^sra 
Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391,231 P 123 (1924) 
In case of a judgment payable in install-
ments, statute runs from time fixed for pay-
ment of each installment for the part then pay-
able, and not from date of the judgment Buell 
v Duchesne Mercantile Co , 64 Utah 391, 231 
P 123 (1924) 
In actions for fraud, statute does not begin to 
run until fraud is discovered or could have 
been reasonably discovered, but even when ac-
tion is not based on fraud, in equity where 
cause of action is concealed from one in whom 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.l<.R.3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating* civil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set- j ^ y
 triai waiver as binding on later state 
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
 c i v i l tris^f 43 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
 Couit reporter's death or disability prior to 
in opposition toj motion for new trial in civil transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
case, 7 AL.R.3d 1000.
 n e w ^ | 7 A L J U t h 1 0 4 9 . 
Quotient verdicts, 8A.LR.3d335 Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
t i o ^ ^ ^T^^^^AL^ 
which they are written, 10 A L.R.3d 501. quacy of damages-modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by „* ,
 c 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
 J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. *»**&* for Personal injury to or death of sea-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference *** ^ a**10*8 ™*« J ° n e s A c t <46 USCS 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
A.L.R.3d 1101. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
of civil case, 25 A.LH.3d 637. der Federal Employers, Liability Act (45 USCS 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of §§51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 189. 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq., 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 HO, 116. 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
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obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 






Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
-Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
*ks judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 





—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 





—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Where a defendant's motion to set aside 
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7) 
and his motion for a new trial claimed that 
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions 
by not providing defendant with a copy of 
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering 
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his 
motion for summary judgment to defendant, 
which the latter claimed was a clear showing 
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could 
have believed in denying defendant's motion, 
that fraud was not present in what could be 
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs 
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly en-
tered into an ill-advised stipulation without 
fully understanding its consequences was cor-
rectly characterized by trial court as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdi-
vision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) ap-
plied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and 
could not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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